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Portuguese Colonialism, Brazil, Cape Verde


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Portuguese colonialism and creolization.

There are three main uses of the expression ‘Creole’ in contemporary Portuguese-speaking contexts.¹ In Portugal it refers to the Cape Verdan language spoken by the large immigrant community from that country, whereas in Cape Verde itself it has come to mean also Cape Verdan identity and culture. In Brazil it carries the negative connotation of lower class ‘Black’ identification and does not have the Spanish American meaning of either mestizo or that of people of European ancestry born in the Americas. In several African contexts it refers to the historical roots of urban coastal social groups that mediated between Portuguese administrators or merchants and the hinterland populations.

The semi-peripheral and subaltern nature of Portuguese colonialism allowed for the creation of many creolized communities, languages and cultural expressions. The concept itself, however, has never become central in ideological definitions of Portuguese colonialism. Rather, miscigenação and mestiçagem were used and have been incorporated in discourses of national identity both in Brazil and Cape Verde and
not so in continental African ex-colonies. This was particularly true during the late colonial period in the twentieth century, when the dictatorial regime used Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre’s interpretation of Brazilian identity and Portuguese expansion as having been a hybridizing humanist endeavour, in order to justify the occupation of African territories at the same time that national liberation movements were starting their struggle in mainland African colonies.

Portuguese expansion started in the fifteenth century in the Atlantic, both with the discovery of the North-Atlantic archipelagos of Madeira and the Azores, and with the establishment of trading posts along the western coast of Africa. The first instances of ‘creolization’ date from this period, mainly with the case of lançados – people who were left among indigenous populations in order to learn their languages and customs. Trading posts were, of course, ideal social settings for the emergence of pidgin linguistic forms of communication for trade.

The history of Portuguese expansion and colonialism can be roughly divided into three distinct periods, marked by the importance of different geographical settings, trade routes and raw materials: India, Brazil, and Africa, roughly corresponding to the 15th and 16th, 17th and 18th, and 19th and 20th centuries. Initially, expansion was based on the search for the control of the commercial routes of ‘Oriental’ spices. Along the coast of Africa trading and slaving posts were established in fortresses that were cut out from the local populations but still allowed for a degree of pidginization and creolization between the Portuguese and local intermediaries between the coast and the hinterland.
When the maritime route to India was discovered in the late fifteenth century, the Portuguese crown’s purpose was not to occupy territory but rather to achieve domain of sea routes. The experience of coastal trading posts or feitorias in Africa was replicated in India; nevertheless a territorial base was established in Goa as of the early sixteenth century. Instances of miscegenation occurred mainly in the Atlantic islands of Cape Verde and São Tomé, off the Atlantic coast of Africa, settled by African slaves and a minority of Portuguese settlers. In India, there are indications that a policy of mixed marriages between Portuguese males and local females was promoted, but this may be largely the result of myth making by both Portuguese colonial ideology and the small group of Goa’s ‘Luso-descendants’.

Portuguese expansion and early colonialism were mainly a state enterprise. Without a trading middle class (as opposed to Venice, Holland or Genoa), the Portuguese crown rented out privileges in trade, and there was a need for considerable foreign capital investment; The Portuguese can be said to have been, initially, transporters on behalf of others. A subaltern form of colonialism was to be the outcome of this situation later in history, as both capital and demographic scarceness continued to characterize the Portuguese social and economic landscape. Also, and from an ideological point of view, early Portuguese ‘colonialism’ or, more accurately, expansion, was strongly based on the notion of a crusade for ‘Christianization’ (and, in the 19th and 20th centuries, for ‘Civilization’).

The ‘First Portuguese Empire’, in Asia (mainly in Goa, India, but also in Malacca and Macau in Southeast Asia and China) was stable from the sixteenth century until 1630, when Dutch and English encroachment increased. In 1665 the eastern empire was
reduced to Goa, Macau and Timor (in Indonesia). Concerns with social classification based on ancestry, geography and what was to become ‘race’ were already present as in the case of Portuguese India, where the local population was divided into several categories along a scale of blood purity, such as ‘white Portuguese born in India’, *castiços* (those born from a European father and an Indian ‘white’ mother, *mestiços* (who were more mulatto in appearance), and ‘pure’ Indians.

The settlement of Brazil (officially ‘discovered’ in 1500) also followed the model of settlement on the coast, with feudal rights granted to captain-generals. Jesuit resistance to enslavement of the local indigenous population contributed to the economically motivated importation of African slaves – which increased in the second half of the sixteenth century – as labour for the sugar plantations. This economic activity was paramount in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and compensated for the decline of Oriental commerce. Brazil became the first real colony of settlement and that trend increased with the discovery of gold in 1700. Brazil was the core of Portuguese empire from the eighteenth century until independence in 1822. The whites and those with white ancestry made up for the dominant class, mainly as large estate owners and, later, as merchants and traders. A distinction was made, however, between those born in Brazil and those born in Portugal, called *reinóis* (from the Realm) or *marinheiros* (sailors). As for the slave population, it came from diverse ethnic backgrounds in Africa, but the relevant distinction was established between those born or raised in Brazil and in the plantations (*crioulos*, from the Portuguese verb *criar*, to raise or to create, and the noun *cria*, human infant or animal cub) and those recently arrived (*boçais*). Another category, that of *ladinos* (roughly meaning ‘smart’ or ‘astute’) were those with some linguistic proficiency in Portuguese. With the increase in manumission,
slavery in the domestic and household sphere and in the number of *mulatos* (mulattoes) born of white male-black female intercourse, social and ‘racial’ classifications became more intricate, eventually leading to the Brazilian system of classification based more on phenotype/colour than on ancestry.

As a result of Napoleon’s invasion of Portugal in the early 19th century, the Portuguese royal family fled to Brazil and established the Portuguese capital in Rio de Janeiro. Brazil was raised to the status of a realm and was to become independent due to the pressure of the local merchant and slave-owning classes and with the support of England as a major trade partner. The heir to the Portuguese throne decided to stay behind in Brazil when the king returned to Portugal, and Brazil became independent in 1822 as a monarchy, with Prince Pedro as emperor. In 1888 slavery was abolished and in 1889 Brazil became a Republic.

The total abolition of slavery in what remained of the Portuguese empire took place in the 1880s (abolition in Portugal had been declared in 1869). Until the decade of 1850 colonial economy was based on slavery, with the transit of slaves from Guinea to Cape Verde and from Angola to São Tomé and Príncipe, and Brazil. Cape Verde was a main point of sojourn for the ‘adaptation’ of slaves before further exportation. Angola, the main colony in Africa, had become specialized in supplying slaves for Brazil between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and was actually more of a colony of Brazil than of Portugal. Local white settlement was scarce, although some forms of intermediary creolized groups did emerge in the coastal towns.
The turn to Africa – and the start of the ‘Third Portuguese Empire’ – was a consequence of the independence of Brazil. Portuguese expeditions in the 1840–50s tried to map the African hinterland in order to claim sovereignty over large tracts of Southern Africa between Angola on the Atlantic coast and Mozambique on the Indian Ocean coast. On the aftermath of the Berlin Conference (started in 1884) that carved out Africa for European colonialism, England issued an ultimatum to Portugal in 1890, stating that Portuguese claims had to be based on effective occupation of the claimed territories. The last years of Monarchy in Portugal and those of the First Republic (1910–1926) were marked by the effort to obtain actual control over the claimed African possessions. But only with the dictatorial regime that started in 1926 (and which was to last in different shapes until 1974) did Portuguese colonialism in its modern sense start. In 1930, when the totalitarian regime was being established, the Colonial Act was issued, proclaiming the need to bring indigenous peoples into western civilization and the Portuguese nation. Assimilation was proclaimed as the main objective, except for the colonies of Cape Verde, India and Macau. Cape Verde was seen as an extension of Portugal, and India and Macau as having their own forms of ‘civilized’ peoples, whereas in mainland Africa a real – if not always legal – distinction was made between white settlers, assimilado in-betweens and the indigenous, ‘uncivilized’ population. In 1953 a new law renamed the Colonies as Provinces and in 1961 the laws that defined the status of indigenous peoples as non-Portuguese were abolished. This was the result of international pressure for decolonization in the post WWII period.

The system of coastal fortresses and feitorias based on agreements with local African polities had been altered by the increasing economic importance of the slave trade, mainly to Brazil. Besides this country, Portuguese settlement as such only occurred in
the islands of Madeira and the Azores (with Portuguese settlers), and in Cape Verde and São Tomé e Príncipe with both Portuguese settlers and African slaves. These two African archipelagos witnessed the emergence of populations of mixed origins, and Creole languages developed fully. Efforts to keep an empire in Africa had a strong ideological motivation, based on Portuguese self-representations of national identity as the pioneering country in the ‘discovery’ and Christianization of the heathen world. This trend was to be accentuated by the fact that Portuguese modern colonialism in Africa was actually the enterprise of a dictatorial and ultra-conservative regime. Until the late 1950s, miscegenation was seen as a negative occurrence, but after Gilberto Freyre’s influence, the regime radically changed its rhetoric to one of appraisal of miscegenation and assimilation within a ‘pluri-continental and pluri-racial nation’.

But miscegenation and the emergence of forms of mixed culture occurred mostly as side effects, not as the result of a policy. Portugal had a small population throughout its imperial and colonial history; it lacked an entrepreneurial class; the crown rented out trade routes, lands and labour to foreign interests, when it did not promote semi-feudal forms of occupation. But the religious motivations (conversion of the heathen), the tradition of coastal feitorias, miscegenation between unequal gender hierarchies (between white men and African women), forms of manumission of the children of these unions and the emergence of a colour continuum of phenotypical scaling rather than what was to be the USA one-drop rule, certainly were factors that allowed for the emergence of intermediary groups both in phenotype, language and culture.

In the Asian locations, commercial activities and religious conversion allowed for the formation of a small group of Eurasians in Macau and Malacca, as well as for a small
elite of Christianized Portuguese descendants in India. In both Malacca and Macau, Creole languages emerged. In the cases of Angola and Mozambique creole languages did not emerge and a policy of coastal shipping of slaves – in the Angolan case largely by Portuguese Brazilians – did not create economic and social conditions for the emergence of significant intermediary groups. Some coastal towns in Angola, however, did see the emergence of something of the sort. Dias (1984) uses the term crioulo to refer to descendants of Europeans born locally (both whites and mestiço) or de-tribalized Africans (civilizado or assimilado). Although her nomenclature is tentative she claims that their behaviour was similar to that of other African elites as identified by Curtin (1972) or Cohen (1981) for Sierra Leone, Ghana or Senegal. The word however was seldom used in 19th century Angola and referred to slaves born in the colony. In another paper, Dias (2002) expands on the population of Mbaka as descendants of mixed marriages between Portuguese men and African women, who had become traders between the coast and the hinterland and who had adopted diacritic signs of Portugueseness in dress and language.

What happened in the African colonies of Angola and Mozambique can, then, hardly be described as creolization. As we shall see later, 20th-century attempts at promoting assimilation were rhetorical. In Guinea Bissau a creole language did emerge, but as an interethnic communication language side by side with indigenous ones and is related to the Cape Verdeans’ role as surrogate administrators of Portuguese interests in Guinea Bissau. On the other side of the globe, creole languages and mixed identities were limited to the Christians of Goa, the Kristang (i.e. ‘Christians’) of Malacca and the Eurasians of Macau, all populations that have dwindled considerably to this day.
From a linguistic point of view, forms of Portuguese-based Creoles expanded with the slave trade. D. Pereira (2002) provides us with a list of creole languages of Portuguese extraction: in Africa, the Upper Guinea Creoles include languages spoken in Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Casamanse (in Senegal), and those of the Gulf of Guinea include São Tomé and Príncipe, and Anobon. Indo-Portuguese Creoles are those of India proper (Diu, Daman, Bombay, Chaul, Korlai, Mangalor, Cananor, Tellicherry, Mahé, Cochin, Vaipin, Qilom, and the Coasts of Coromandel and Bengal), as well as the Creoles of Sri Lanka (Trincomalee and Batticaloa, Mannar and the Puttallam area). As for the specific case of Goa – the location of a longer and more intense Portuguese settlement in Asia –, she says that it is not clear whether a creole was formed. In Asia, Portuguese-based Creoles appeared in Malaysia (Malacca, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore) and in some islands of Indonesia (Java, Flores, Ternate, Ambon, Macassar and Timor), known as Malayo-Portuguese. Sino-Portuguese Creoles could be found in Macau and Hong Kong. In the Americas, Papiamento – the Iberian-based Creole of Curaçao, Aruba and Bonaire – can be included in the list, as well as Saramacan (Surinam), because of strong Portuguese lexical bases, although they are sometimes classified as respectively Spanish and English-based. Some authors talk of a semi-Creole in Brazil and of some Afro-Brazilian forms that could correspond to an advanced phase of decreolization. Note that the colony of settlement par excellence, Brazil, did not develop a creole form, but rather what is (linguistically but certainly also politically) considered as a ‘variation’ of Portuguese. Access to the Portuguese language model and the role of the elites in building the nation-state may be explanatory factors here.

This leaves us with the two instances of, simultaneously, the development of creole languages as mother tongues, the emergence of creole social landscapes, and ‘racial’
miscegenation: the archipelagos of São Tomé and Príncipe, and Cape Verde. The latter case is what comes to the mind of any Portuguese when the word *crioulo* is pronounced. It refers foremost to the language. For Cape Verdeans themselves it has increasingly become a metaphor for their own self-description as a group and national culture, a case that will be analysed further on.

In order to assess the importance of creolization today, one needs, therefore, to contextualize Creoles and creolization within the historical, cultural and political-economic history of expansion, colonialism and post-colonialism. Of particular importance is the period of late colonialism in the 20th century. That is because the period corresponds to one of mutual constitution of post-colonial identities in the ex-colonies and the reinforcement of conservative discourses of national identity in Portugal. The ways in which elite anthropological, colonial and emancipatory discourses were intertwined, first in Brazil, then in late-colonial Portugal and in Cape Verde, around the concepts of miscegenation, lusotropicalism and, marginally, creoleness, are a case of the colonial production of hybrids that challenges naïve assumptions about creolization.

*Miscegenation and luso-tropicalism from Brazil to the Portuguese Empire*

One of the classical locations for discussions of hybridism and *miscigenação* or *mestiçagem* (and its relation with the idea of nation) is Latin America, especially the national contexts with a strong presence of descendants of Africans. Peter Wade (1993a) has conducted one of the best analyses of the interaction between discrimination and *mestiçagem* (*mestizaje* in the Hispanic case). This interaction
between patterns of discrimination and tolerance happens within the identity project of
the national elites, who set forth the notion of an essentially mixed – *mestiza* – nation.
Although it is generally accepted that ‘races’ are social constructions or categorical
identifications based on a discourse on the physical aspect and ancestry, Wade notes,
however, that that which passes for physical difference and ancestry is not at all
obvious. Apparently there is a ‘natural fact’ of phenotypic variation on the basis of
which culture constructs categorical identifications. But the act of defining a
nature/culture relation mediated by this productionistic logic (Haraway 1989: 13)
obscures the fact that there is no such thing as a pre-discursive and universal encounter
with ‘nature’ and, therefore, with phenotypic variation (Wade 1993: 3). Therefore,
racial categories are doubly processual: firstly as a result of the variable perceptions of
the nature/culture division that they mediate; secondly, as a result of the play between
claims and attributions of identity in the context of relations of power (1993: 4).

The emergence of nationalism in Latin America did not involve the national
incorporation of the lower classes in the European fashion. It was mediated by creole
elites (in the Hispanic sense: Europeans born in the Americas) who had been excluded
from political control during the colonial period (Anderson 1983: 50). One central
problem was the contradiction between the mixed nature of the population and the
‘white’ connotations of progress and modernity. The problem was ‘solved’ with a
compromise: to celebrate *mestizaje* as the core of Latin American originality. On the
other hand, Blacks and Indians were romanticized as part of a glorious past and it was
foreseen that they would be integrated in the future — in a process that would involve
further racial mixing, preferably with whitening consequences (Wade 1993: 10). This
compromise is obvious in the way racial theories of the time were received. They
tended to classify Blacks and Indians as inferior, and hybrids were thought to be
negatively influenced by these ‘races’. But the elites tended to downplay the negative
implications by downplaying biological determinism, emphasizing instead
environmental and educational factors (as was to do, for instance, Gilberto Freyre in
Brazil, with the use of neo-Lamarckianism). However, underneath the democratic
discourse on *mestiçagem* and *mestizaje*, lay the hierarchical discourse on whitening.

In Brazil, and according to Seyferth (1991), both those who supported whitening and
those who were against African or Asian immigration (as well as those who privileged
European immigration in the post-abolition of slavery period), believed that the
Brazilian people or ‘race’ needed yet to be formed through a melting pot process that
would result in homogeneity. But they all imagined European immigrants as
representatives of superior ‘races’ destined to whiten a *mestiço* and Black population.
The belief that Brazil has no racial question because there is no prejudice – a common
feature in both everyday and social science theories – has paradoxically served to
legitimize the emphasis in the miscegenation of ‘races’ seen as unequal – thus
presupposing the ‘triumph’ (genetic but also civilizational) of the white ‘race’.

‘An unfortunate experiment of the Portuguese’

I would like to focus on the Portuguese case, while keeping in mind the Brazilian one,
since Brazil has been an object of transfer and projection in the construction of
Portuguese national representations. Once Brazil became independent, the focus of
Portuguese governments shifted direction towards the African colonies. The new
colonization of Africa was slow and did not amount to much in the way of practical
results (see Alexandre and Dias 1998). But the notion of Empire and the national utopia of building ‘New Brazils’ in Africa after the loss of Brazil, were part of the boosting and maintenance of national pride. Nevertheless, academic and elite discourses, such as anthropology, focused mainly on the definition of Portugal and the Portuguese. A consistent and lasting colonial anthropology was practically non-existent. This does not, however, preclude that self-representations were also based on representations of the colonial Other, even if there was no miscegenation with those Others. Miscegenation had been useful in the construction of Brazil as a neo-European nation in the Americas, but would be contradictory with a notion of Empire in Africa.

We can identify three ‘periods’ in the debates on hybridism and miscegenation. Anthropologists Eusébio Tamagnini and Mendes Correia can personify the first period – which was one of concern with the racial definition of the Portuguese and of opposition to miscegenation. A second, more culturalist period, is personified by Jorge Dias and the influence of Freyre in his work; it is a period of concern with the plural ethnic origins of the Portuguese and with the resolution of the ‘colonial problem’ in the light of the Brazilian experience. Finally, a third period would correspond to the post-1974 era (when democracy was restaured) and will remain outside the scope of this essay.

Eusébio Tamagnini and Mendes Correia were the leaders of two schools of anthropology, respectively in Coimbra and Oporto. Their work influenced a period from the late 19th to the early twentieth centuries, encompassing the Constitutional Monarchy, the First Republic and the dictatorship of the Estado Novo. In 1902, in a paper on the population of São Tomé, composed of the descendants of slave settlers and indentured labourers, Tamagnini asked: ‘The crossing between colonizing and
colonized races: what is the worth of its products?’ (1902: 11). His answer was: ‘(…) the dialect of São Tomé, being a creole that belongs to the second group, must be seen as a degenerate version of Continental Portuguese’ (1902: 13). Further on he says that

... Easiness in relationships among the natives resulted necessarily in unfaithfulness and jealousy, which are obviously the causes for most crimes committed in Creole societies: prostitution, indecent behaviour, and its repugnant varieties, such as pederasty, lesbianism, rape and so on, which are practiced in a terrifying way in Creole societies, and which are the most obvious evidence of the shameful way in which the European peoples have been civilizing and colonizing the other peoples that they call savages. (1902: 39–40 in Santos 1996: 49)

Throughout his career, Tamagnini was to publish several studies from 1916 to 1949. Influenced by Broca’s and Topinard’s work, he was looking for anthropometric statistical averages among the Portuguese, wanting these to coincide with those of the average European. Although after the 1920s he had to take into consideration the developments in genetics, he did so within a Malthusian framework in connection with colonial issues. In the First National Congress of Colonial Anthropology in 1934 in Oporto (one year after the legislation of the Colonial Act), he alerted to the dangers of mestiçagem: ‘when two peoples or two races have reached different cultural levels and have organized completely different social systems, the consequences of mestiçagem are necessarily disastrous’ (Tamagnini 1934a: 26 in Santos 1996: 137). In a panel on population in the Congress on the Portuguese World (at the occasion of the Portuguese World Expo that dictator Salazar set up to promote Portuguese colonialism), he presented a study about the blood groups of the Portuguese and concluded that the
Portuguese population had ‘been able to maintain relative ethnic purity’ (…) (Tamagnini 1940: 22 in Santos 1996: 145). However, in 1944 he had to acknowledge – albeit with one important safeguard - that:

... It would be foolish to pretend denying the existence of mestiçagem between the Portuguese and the elements of the so-called coloured races. The fact that they are a colonizing people makes it impossible to avoid ethnic contamination. What one can not accept is the raising of such mestiçagem to the category of a sufficient factor of ethnic degeneration to such a point that anthropologists would have to place the Portuguese outside the white races or classify them as Negroid mestiços…” (Tamagnini 1944 in Santos 1996: 12)

In the year following the 1926 coup that established dictatorship, Mendes Correia (head of the Institute of Anthropology and Ethnology in Oporto) had called for the segregation of relapsing criminals, for the sterilization of degenerates, and for the regulation of immigration and the banning of marriage for professional beggars. In 1932 Mendes Correia invited Renato Kehl, president of the Brazilian Eugenics organization to give a conference in Oporto. On the occasion, the Brazilian scientist proposed the introduction of both positive and negative eugenic measures, publicized the advantages of marriage within the same class or race and condemned mestiçagem for being ‘dissolving, dissuasive, demoralizing and degrading’.

Although eugenics was not a successful approach in Portugal, the question of ‘racial improvement’ was much discussed in 1934, in relation to the colonial question and the issue of mestiçagem. Although some participants in the First Congress of Colonial
Anthropology praised *mestiçagem*, Tamagnini was against it. Based on a study of somatology and aptitude tests done with sixteen Cape Verdean and six Macau *mestiços* who had come to the Colonial Expo of 1934 in Oporto, Mendes Correia concluded that miscegenation was a condemnable practice. In the plenary session Tamagnini reminded that ‘the little repugnance that the Portuguese have regarding sexual approaches to elements of other ethnic origins is often presented as evidence of their higher colonizing capacity’, and asserted that ‘it is necessary to change radically such an attitude’ (Tamagnini 1934b: 26 in Castelo 1998: 111). He continues: ‘It is in the social arena that the fact of *mestiçagem* has graver consequences. The *mestiços*, because they do not adapt to either system, are rejected by both…’ (in Castelo 1998: 111). Mendes Correia couldn’t agree more: ‘Being mulatto is longing for oneself … just like the despised hermaphrodite outcries the conflict between the sexes … the *mestiço* is thus an unexpected being in the plan of the world, an unfortunate experiment of the Portuguese’ (Mendes Correia 1940: 122 in Castelo 1998: 112).

*Luso-Tropicalism and the Portuguese Colonial Conundrum*

This stand was eventually reversed with Luso-tropicalism. Any discussion of the trend must be based on a reading of Gilberto Freyre’s *Casa Grande e Senzala* (*Masters and Slaves*) (MS), first published in Brazil in 1933. It was first published in Portugal in 1957, with six subsequent editions until 1983. The work’s success indicates the circularity of the discourse that links Gilberto Freyre, the bibliography on ethnogenesis and identity in both Portugal and Brazil, and the Portuguese colonial ideologies. For that reason my reading of MS focuses on the issues of Portuguese identity and the Portuguese colonial ‘adventure’ (for an extended analysis see Vale de Almeida 2000 and forthcoming 2003).
Freyre argues for the ‘peculiar disposition of the Portuguese for a hybrid and slaveocratic colonization of the Tropics’,⁴ which he explains as a result of the Portuguese ‘ethnic, or rather cultural, past, as a people undefined between Europe and Africa’ (1992 [1933]:5). Then he defines the Portuguese as marked by ‘a shaky balance of antagonisms’ (1992:6). The main antagonism would be rooted on the Euro-African mixture, i.e., in the ethnically hybrid character of the Portuguese in the pre-Discoveries period. The scarcity of human capital was supposedly overcome during the colonialization process by ‘extreme mobility and miscegenation’ (1992:8). The Portuguese ‘joyfully mixed with women of colour... and multiplied in mixed children’ (1992:9). The colonial system was based on the slaveocratic and patriarchal family that conveyed a _sui generis_ sexual morality. Portuguese plasticity – which made the synthesis of miscegenation, mobility and adaptation – led to a process of non-Europeanization of Brazil; this was largely achieved thanks to the role of cultural mediator played by the Africans.

Freyre’s book was to be accused of creating an idyllic image of colonial society, one in which relationships between masters and slaves are not explained in racial and political-economic terms, but rather as a culturalist result of the migration of Iberian family patriarchy and patronage to the tropics. Araújo (1994) stresses Freyre’s neo-Lamarckian conception of race, thanks to which ‘the category of biological stock as a race definer becomes malleable by the environment, by climate’.

Freyre’s purpose was to break up with the latent or explicit racism that characterized a good part of Brazilian production on miscegenation up until 1933. Two standpoints
were then prevalent: the first one said that the country was not viable; the second refused that condemnation and claimed that miscegenation could be seen as whitening, thus redeeming Brazil (Araújo 1994:29). A third one was Freyre’s: it distinguished race from culture and proposed another vision of national identity, one in which the ‘obsession with progress and reason… is replaced up to a point by an interpretation that considers… the hybrid and peculiar articulation of traditions…’ (Araújo 1994:29)

Hybrid ethnic origins; mobility, miscegenation, adaptation (*aclimatibilidade*), resulting in plasticity; slaveocratic patriarchalism and patronage; and, furthermore, the hybris, particularly sexual excess. All of these elements in Freyre’s canon are to be found in the representations of Portuguese identity before and after Freyre. One can find them in Portuguese social sciences and literature, in official discourses and in common sense identity self-representations with amazing resilience and capacity to adapt to different political situations. That which in Brazil was to become a construction of exceptionality (‘racial democracy’, ‘cordiality’, ‘contention of social explosions’ etc.), was to become, in Portugal, a construction of exceptionality of the Discoveries and Expansion. Portuguese exceptionalism, as an ideological construct, was actually to increase during the harsher times of the colonial conflict in Africa (1961–1975).

Although the foundations of Luso-Tropicalism are already implicit in MS (1933), it was not made explicit until Freyre’s lecture in Goa in 1951 called *Uma Cultura Moderna: a Luso-tropical* (A Modern Culture: Luso-Tropical). The doctrine is developed and explained in *Um Brasileiro em Terras Portuguesas* (A Brazilian in Portuguese Lands, 1955, including the Goa lecture), in *Integração Portuguesa nos Trópicos* (Portuguese
Integration in the Tropics, 1958) and in *O Luso e o Trópico* (The Luso and the Tropic, 1961).

*Um Brasileiro em Terras Portuguesas* (BTP) is a collection of speeches that were proffered between 1951 and 1952 during Freyre’s journeys in the Portuguese colonies, as a guest of Portugal’s Minister of the Overseas. In 1952, during a lecture in Coimbra called *Em Torno de Um Novo Conceito de Tropicalismo* (On a New Concept of Tropicalism) Freyre resumes his ideas from the Goa lecture in the previous year:

…I believe that I have found during that journey the expression that I was missing to characterize that sort of Lusitanian civilization which, after being victorious in the tropics, is today still in expansion (…) The expression – Luso-tropical – seems to me to reveal the fact that Lusitanian expansion in Africa, Asia and America shows an obvious inclination, on the part of the Portuguese, to an adaptation to the tropics which is not just based on interest, but is also voluptuous … (1955 (1952):134)

How was the Luso-Tropicalist program received in Portugal? According to Castelo (1996), the reception was heterogeneous. On the right wing of the political and ideological spectrum, a nationalistic interpretation was made, highlighting the specificity of Portuguese colonization; this position would eventually become the regime’s attitude towards Luso-Tropicalism after WWII. On the left, there was more criticism (although never a clear opposition): either by comparing doctrine with historical facts or with the actual policies implemented in the colonies. Castelo says that the imperial renaissance of the thirties and forties could not easily accept Freyre’s
culturalism; it would rather stress the inferiority of Blacks or the superiority of European civilization. This indicates one of the ‘ambiguous fertilities’ of Freyre’s work: anti-racialist in the Boasian sense, on the one hand, but based on a sort of essentialist culturalism on the other.

The great transformation would happen after WWII. Portugal felt tremendous anti-colonial pressure and tried to adapt to it. The main events and reactions were the creation of the UN and its Charter; anti-colonial conferences of third-world countries (especially Bandung in 1954); the abolishment of the Colonial Act and the change in colonial denominations (from ‘colonies’ and ‘Empire’ to ‘Provinces’ and ‘Overseas’); and the creation of a rhetoric of the pluri-continental and pluri-racial nature of the nation. Freyre’s journey in the colonies took place in 1951, the same year of the Constitutional amendment that tried to refresh colonialism with the above-mentioned changes. Freyre’s doctrine then became useful for Portuguese diplomacy between the Bandung Conference of 1954 and Portugal’s acceptance as a member of the UN in 1955.

It was in the academic field, however, that the doctrine was more influential. Adriano Moreira introduced Freyre’s ideas in his course on Overseas Politics at the School of Overseas Studies. He was backed up by the acceptance of the Luso-Tropicalist criterion by influential scholars such as geographer Orlando Ribeiro, anthropologist Jorge Dias and human ecologist Almerindo Lessa. The beginning of the war in Angola (1961) and the previous invasion / liberation / reintegration (according to different points of view) of Portuguese India, led the policy makers to an attempt to ‘lusotropicalize’ overseas’ legislation and administration. Moreira, head of the Centro de Estudos Políticos e
Sociais, introduced some reforms when he took the post of Minister of the Overseas (1960–62); he abolished the Native Status Laws and promoted administrative decentralization – policies which led to his demise as minister due to the pressure exerted by the integrationist sectors of the regime.

According to Rui Pereira (1986) the dictatorial regime had to rethink the relationship between colonizers and colonized in order to avoid nationalist movements. That was how JIU (the Overseas Research Board) ‘embraced Malinowski’s teachings’ (Pereira 1986:219) with a thirty year delay. Jorge Dias, an anthropologist influenced by American culturalism and by Freyre and who was in charge of new missions for the study of overseas’ ethnology, was nevertheless faced with the harshness of colonial reality. Pereira highlights this sentence in the Mission Report of 1957 by Dias: ‘Blacks… fear us… and when they compare us with other whites they always do so unfavorably for us’ (Dias, in Pereira: 223). The following passage is even more revealing:

…We are told time and time again that the natives prefer the Portuguese to the English because we treat them more humanely and take interest in their lives. This tale is repeated just like some errors pass on from one book to another,7 because the authors prefer to repeat what others have said instead of checking the accuracy of the information…” (Dias, in Pereira 1986: 224)

Note that the year was 1959, a few years after Freyre’s travels in the colonies (in 1951–52. The written results were published in 1955). Dias’ criticisms were a harsh blow on the regime’s love for Luso-Tropicalism as defined by Freyre in 1958 in Portuguese
Integration in the Tropics, published by JIU and by the Center ran by Adriano Moreira). Jorge Dias actually said in the Mission Report of 1957 that ‘many of those in charge who live in the area believe that we will not be around twenty years from now’ (Dias, in Pereira 1986:203). He was right. Armed struggle began in the region in 1964, three years after it had started in Angola – when Adriano Moreira was Minister of the Overseas. It was precisely in this juncture – marked by the first real attempts at colonization and colonial development, on the one hand, and by the beginning of the liberation movements, on the other – that Luso-Tropicalism became useful in helping transform the representations and practices of the anachronistic Portuguese colonialism.

I have already mentioned that Adriano Moreira, besides having been a major figure in the political and social sciences of the late colonial period, was also Minister of the Overseas between 1960 and 1962. During a speech as Minister, in 1961, and while talking about the settlement policies directed at Portuguese soldiers who had been drafted in the beginning of the colonial war, he said that

…We want to make it clear to the commonwealth of nations our national decision to pursue a policy of multiracial integration, without which there will be neither peace nor civilization in Black Africa (…) it is a policy whose benefits are proven by the largest country of the future, Brazil …’ (Moreira 1961:10–11)

In his Contribuição de Portugal para a valorização do homem no Ultramar (Portugal’s contribution to the uplifting of Man overseas) (1963 (1958)), he refused to accept the notion of conflict that underlay anti-colonial theories, for it did not leave room for human dignity and ‘polarizes white man and Black man, forgetting the universalistic
and humanistic message of the Discoveries’ (1963 (1958): 12). How could Moreira legitimate this statement? He did so by saying that

The great sociologist Gilberto Freyre is right when he notes that in Toynbee’s oppositional classification of civilizations that peculiar way of being in the world that he fortunately named Luso-Tropical is missing (…) It was this conception of egalitarian life, of human democracy, that was the most significant contribution of Portuguese action in the world (…) absolutely oblivious to notions of conflict and domination, or to the feeling of racial superiority or inferiority…’ (1963 (1958): 13)

Luso-Tropicalism was not an anthropological theory or school. It was – and is – a discourse born within a tradition of culturalist essay writing on national identity, specificity, and exceptionalism. And it was so both in Brazil and Portugal. The Brazilian social dynamics – especially in what concerns race and ethnicity – could easily de-legitimize Luso-Tropicalism. In Portugal the same could be done by the crisis that put an end to colonialism and the authoritarian regime that supported it and was supported by it.

On one hand, something that we could call ‘generic’ Luso-Tropicalism remains alive – as an inclination, a common sense interpretation, sometimes as official representation. Luso-Tropicalism has become an ideological social fact. On the other hand, some historical facts of Portuguese colonialism that inspired Luso-Tropicalism are undoubtedly specific from a historical and cultural point of view. This specific reality should be studied within comparative colonial studies. Three concerns should be taken
into account, however: critical attention to the resilience of Luso-Tropicalism under the
guise of Lusophony and its avatars; complex understanding of historical and cultural
transits and traffics between Europe, the Americas, and Africa, thus overcoming a
Lusocentric perspective; and comparison with other colonial and postcolonial cases.

The Cape Verdean Case. Local Elites and the Invention of Identity in a Colonial Context.

One of Freyre’s stops in his journeys across the Portuguese empire was Cape Verde. There he had become the guru of the local literary elite, who saw in Luso-Tropicalism the explanation for Cape Verde’s creoleness. In fact, the members of the literary movement named after the journal Claridade, notably Baltasar Lopes, thought that Cape Verde was a better example than Brazil of the successes of Luso-tropical ‘civilization’. Cape Verdeans were in an in-between situation. Officially, they were not classified as indigenous peoples, but as Portuguese citizens, as opposed to Angolans, Guineans, or Mozambicans; nevertheless, Cape Verde was, in name and in fact, a colony, not a region like the Azores or Madeira. Authors in Claridade developed nevertheless a notion of ‘regionalism’: they saw Cape Verde as a regional variety of Portugal, as much as the North Atlantic islands or any of Continental Portugal’s provinces. This, they claimed, was a result of miscegenation and creolization. Freyre’s writings on his visit to Cape Verde started a bitter polemic since, instead of confirming Claridade’s ideas, Freyre found Cape Verde to be too… African. Creole language, in particular, was seen by the Brazilian scholar as a sign of Africanity, not as a sign of a complete synthesis of European and African cultural contributions. That was supposedly Brazil’s achievement.
According to Gabriel Fernandes (2002), the literary elite in Cape Verde claimed for itself the role of mediator in the relations between the natives and the colonial power. Throughout the history of Cape Verde this was achieved by means of shifting the border between dispossessed *filhos da terra* (sons of the land) and property owning *brancos da terra* (whites of the land) to a border opposing *brancos da terra* and *brancos metropolitanos* (metropolitan whites, i.e., from Portugal), ‘Cape Verdians’ (‘civilized’) and ‘Africans’ (‘indigenous’), colonizer and colonized. There were three crucial moments in this process. The first was the period between the Berlin Conference (1884–85) and the Republican regime in Portugal (1910–26). The foundation in 1869 of a Catholic seminar (secondary education did not exist until then) in the island of São Nicolau promoted the education of the elites and fostered the engagement of Cape Verdeans in the administration of the colony of Guinea-Bissau. In the intellectual milieu this was the period of the *Nativistas*, whose claims to Portuguese citizenship went hand in hand with an appraisal of Africa, on the one hand, and the Cape Verde motherland, on the other. The second period goes from the beginning of dictatorship (after 1926) up until 1960. The period was marked by an investment in establishing differences between Africa and Cape Verde (Cape Verde as *not* Africa) as well as by the increasing participation of Cape Verdesan elite members and civil servants in ‘civilizing natives’ in mainland Africa. The people from *Claridade* focused on *mestiçagem* as an expression of the cultural portugueseness of Cape Verde and on the archipelago as an instance of Portuguese regionalism (Fernandes 2002:16). The third period, starting with WWII was the era of stronger colonial presence and institutional work with, for instance, the creation of *Boletim de Cabo Verde* (a journal of colonial studies of the archipelago), calls for the intervention of the local literary elite, and the sending of specialists to study the islands. Fernandes notes that colonial power had left for the local intellectuals the
responsibility to prove being worthy of differential treatment and that it was now co-opting their production in order to avoid the temptations of independence. On the one hand, there was Claridade, on the other the youngsters of the Casa dos Estudantes do Império – the so-called ‘Generation of ‘50’, who were influenced by Négritude and called for the ‘reafricanization of the minds’. They were to become members of the independence movement for both Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, PAIGC.⁹

Mestiçagem and creolization – as well as creole as a language – are products of a specific history of social relations, social structure and political economy. I shall follow Fernandes’ (2002) outline. The first settlers of the deserted islands of Cape Verde were white men, either single or married, involved in trade with the coast of Guinea. They had to produce in the islands the merchandise for trade. They did so together with those slaves who were allocated to agriculture and cattle raising, and not re-exported to the Americas. Small-scale agriculture in the islands was a very different situation from that of Caribbean or Brazilian plantations. The Cape Verdean system soon enabled a raising number of manumissions, as well as a growing number of non-white línguas (interpreters to be used in mainland Africa) and clergymen. Fernandes claims that the weight of the ‘ethnic’ (i.e., ‘racial) element was minimized by those occurrences and by the increasing moral and economic weakness of the white master due to agricultural poverty and pirate attacks. The result was a double movement towards creolization and whitening, which led to a de-substantialization of ‘race’, which became more of an indicator of status and power than a criterium for placement in an essentialistic hierarchy.
Slaves were made *ladino* (i.e., ‘domesticated’, ‘europeanized’), whether to be exported or to be used for domestic service. Both slave labor and the female slave were taken possession of, resulting in a growing number of bastard children (2002:36). The category *Filhos da terra* (children of the land) began to define children whose legitimacy and social acknowledgment were tied to their organic link with the mother land (2002:42), which amounted to a process of liberation from the condition of ‘Blacks’ by means of appropriation of the material or symbolic goods of the (white) father. This process Fernandes calls ‘socioeconomic whitening’. This reinterpretation of race favoured a new hegemony, that of the *brancos da terra* (whites of the land, i.e., culturally ‘European’, regardless of dark skin colour) (2002:44). Education, emigration or primitive accumulation led to the ascension of the sons of the land when the whites – faced with droughts, pirate attacks, and low agricultural yields – returned to Portugal taking with them most of the accumulated wealth.

Differently from the Latin America case, in Cape Verde the *mestiços* did not occupy the interstitial social spaces. That sort of mediation was the task of the *brancos da terra* and, later, that of the local literary elites (2002:47). The many *mestiços* were not overcoming the extremes; *mestiço* status was not the escape hatch in some bipolar ‘racial’ system; rather, they were the actors in a permanent struggle for the abolition of their ‘birth defects’, i.e., in a search for whitening, not a search for creolization. They actively promoted Portuguese culture, not a *mestiço* or Black culture (2002:48–9). In sum, Fernandes claims the weak political consistency and weak heuristic dimension of *mestiçagem* in Cape Verde (2002:51): ‘It was while trying to become a white that the son of the land found out that he was *mestiço*’ (2002:51). Instead of the bastards’ wish to be recognized as legal consanguine heirs to their white fathers, the *filhos da terra*
wished to see their cultural link to the nation recognized. With growing colonial penetration in the 19th century, and after the abolition of the remains of feudal land systems, it was increasingly presumed that a common culture was being shared, one that was structured according to the variable of education: ‘the white father/master is replaced by the teacher/boss’ (Fernandes 2002:67).

Gabriel Mariano (1991 [1959]) was pivotal in exploring the hypothesis of the social aristocratization of the *mestiço*, alleging that in Cape Verde the *mestiço* performed the functions that in Brazil were reserved for the whites (Fernandes 2002:86). Mariano’s reading of the Cape Verdian *mestiço* was an attempt at defining a *mestiço cabovertiano* (i.e., specifically Cape Verdean) whom, for Fernandes, was no more than a Portuguese *mestiço*. For the Nativists, however, *mestiço* identity was not central, nor were the ethnic (i.e. ‘racial’) differences between members of the creole society. Their taxonomic frame established, rather, a difference between *filhos da terra* and metropolitan agents, between Portuguese civilization and African civilization, between school culture and popular culture (2002:89), while the authors from *Claridade* were building *mestiçagem* when they thought that they were explaining it (2002:90).

By the late 1950s, several Portuguese intellectuals were visiting the islands in an attempt to help the local elite neutralize the sequels left by the detractors of the established non-African and pro-Portuguese identity model. This happened at a time when the Cape Verdeans’ position as main helpers of Portuguese colonization in Africa was already consolidated – almost 90% of administrative posts in Guinea-Bissau and most of those in Northern Angola were in the hands of Cape Verdeans (Fernandes 2002:137).
The experience of activists and intellectuals from the Generation of ’50 echoes that of the French colonized. They were assimilated students, educated in the colonial metropole, where ‘the presumed branca da terra from Cape Verde experiences his most painful blackness’ (Fernandes 2002:141). In the Cape Verdean case, as in those of many creole island societies, a ‘return to roots’ as a mechanism of compensation was impossible, and the notion of Africa was necessarily a mystification. Manuel Duarte, one of the protagonists of the Generation of ‘50, explained his Africanism as a result of the ‘colonial phenomenon’ (Fernandes 2002:147). They opted for the political character of their re-identification process. Amílcar Cabral, PAIGC’s founder, was to revalue at the same time popular culture and school culture when he stated that ‘a return to origins no longer means a return to traditions’ (Cabral 1977:8). PAIGC, founded in 1956, was to polarize the conflict between colonizer and colonized classes. When it decided to hide in the Guinean countryside in order to start armed struggle, it was faced with tensions between the ‘assimilated’ (the political activists) and the indigenous populations. Another tension was that between founders or leaders of the party, who were mostly Cape Verdeans living in Guinea as civil servants or university students in Portugal, and the Guineans.

Cape Verde was to become independent after the Portuguese democratic revolution of 1974. PAIGC managed to keep the unity between Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau, within an Africanist project. After a coup in Guinea in the 1980s, however, the two countries separated. Cape Verde was to become a multiparty democracy in the 1990s. After that, the trend has been to go back to an idea of specific ‘Cape Verdeaness’. A partial rehabilitation of the legitimizing identity of the colonial period has been under
way, resistance identity has been questioned, at the same time that the local economy has become dependent from Portuguese capital investment.

In sum, Cape Verdean creoleness as a product of elite representations has historically depended on a negation of Africa and on a specific Luso-tropicalist interpretation of the local mixture. Although a certain amount of rehabilitation of African elements has occurred, creoleness is today promoted as a gloss for national culture. Instead of a politically charged concept with emancipatory overtones, creoleness tends to mean the same as ‘Cape Verdean’. The emancipatory character of creolization is lost (see Vergés 2001).

Conclusion

It is quite interesting that the Creole man is anxious to have the anthropologist turn him into the very native that creolization problematizes, in the sense that it estranges him from an origin that can be defined as situated and definable (as native) (Silvestre 2002:89). Silvestre analyses how the thought of Gilberto Freyre, Baltasar Lopes from Claridade and Manuel Ferreira produced the category Crioulo between 1936 (when Claridade was first published) and 1967, when Manuel Ferreira’s A Aventura Crioula was published. He asks why the authors in Claridade were so seduced by Freyre’s ideas, and analyses the means of translation that turned a theory of miscegenation into a theory of emancipation, especially why it was not discarded after the cooptation of lusotropicalism by the Portuguese colonial and dictatorial regime. His question can be summarized thus: how could a theory of emancipation function at the same time as a theory of colonization?
In ‘Uma Experiência Românica nos Trópicos’ (‘A Roman Experience in the Tropics’, in Claridade, 4) Baltasar Lopes used Arthur Ramos’ notions (in fact, Herskovits’ notions) on acceptance, adaptation and reaction in the acculturation process. In the essay, Cape Verde is portrayed as a better example of Freyre’s ideas on acculturation than Brazil. This would in turn mean that African culture would be more lost in Cape Verde, since acceptance would have gone farther. In order to help build an emancipatory theory, Freyre’s notions had to be hyper-corrected, so that they could be adapted to the Cape Verden case, where miscegenation had supposedly been more complete, especially in language. Silvestre notes that

This is an intrinsically ambivalent position, since Cape Verde is thus constituted into a subject by means of being dispossessed from the deep logic of colonization that made it into an object ... This was implicit in the thought of the Claridade authors and was made explicit by Gabriel Mariano in 1959 ...: ‘Cape Verde became a Nation in spite of colonialism. It was something that backfired on colonialism’ (Mariano 1991[1959]: 61’) (Silvestre 2002:73)

Since this ambivalence is structural, it is impossible to validate the strategies of Cape Verden identity that attribute to Claridade the role of making a clear cut separation between a colonial ‘before’ and a postcolonial ‘after’ (Silvestre 2002: 74):

Claridade is the critical place of an abrasive juxtaposition – therefore unresolved – of emancipation and colonization. Probably the responsibility for that unresolved juxtaposition is the concept of creoleness [crioulidade]. It is curious
that Claridade’s theorization on the concept has become the official and non-official legitimation of Cape Verdean identity (Silvestre 2002:76).

The concept of culture conveyed by Claridade granted central importance to ethnography,13 due to the interest in language and national culture of the people. This led to the typically modern gesture of the ‘fatal junction of the concept of nationality with the concept of culture’ (Gilroy 1993:2, in Silvestre 2002:78). Silvestre notes that the fact of celebrating Cape Verdean identity as miscegenated was an important political act in the 1930s and 1940s, since Freyre’s conceptions were not yet accepted by the colonial regime. In the process of national identification by the Cape Verdean literary elites, creoleness (crioulidade) became a synonym of ethnicity and nationality in a specific territory. Historicity – slavery, colonialism, nationalism and African socialism after independence – are not forgotten; they are sublimated; they are glossed in the elites’ constant debate on the more or less European or African character of the islands.

The iconic cultural product of mestiçagem and creolization is Creole language, seen as Cape Verde’s most specific cultural product, especially because it is the mother tongue of the ‘people’ (i.e., the ‘folk’ or the lower classes). Creole language has a specific history and sociology, though. It was first treated as ‘the language of the Negro’, in a clear opposition to Portuguese. It has been the language of the poor or, in the case of the elites, the language of the domestic space, of inter-class interactions, or of intimacy. It is marked throughout by metaphors of gender (as maternal and domestic), space, interaction, class and race; at least until the people from Claridade welcomed it as a regional expression within the Portuguese empire and the precipitate of lusotropical miscegenation.
Although both languages are now official in Cape Verde, a clear demarcation subsists between Portuguese as the official language and Creole as the national language. Braz Dias (2002) says that the use of both languages is permeated by issues of authority and resistance, social identity and distance. If the modern nation state needs to define a language in a patterned way as a support for its bureaucratic system, bureaucracy in Cape Verde grows with the use of Portuguese and clashes with Creole in the field of identity. A factor of inequality is thus created. A series of oppositions between Portuguese and Creole (also known as *Caboverdiano* or *Kauberdianu*) are outlined by Braz Dias: between official, international, formal, written, state and bureaucracy, cultural domination, elites and modernity, on the one hand; and, on the other, maternal, national, informal, oral, the Nation, cultural resistance, the masses and tradition. The outlining of the two fields is of course part of the ideology of language itself, since there is a geographical island variation of the Creole, on the one hand, and any dichotomy is destroyed by considerations of the Creole continuum, on the other. The still subaltern situation of Creole generates diglossia in this continuum.

In Cape Verde, creoleness has come to be the definer of national cultural specificity, not part of a positively valued project of hybridization. This is the result of the work of the elites that built a ‘regional’ identity within the colonial empire, using the resource of their special status as non-indigenous colonials. What seems to be left out of consideration is the projective character of creolization as a form of surpassing nationalism, ethnic exclusivism and racism. This would takes us to Portugal, where ‘miscegenation’ (the local gloss for creolization) is always discoursed as that which the Portuguese did in the world in the past and elsewhere, not as that which is desirable for
a contemporary national society marked by immigration from the ex-colonies and chauvinistic resistance against multiculturalism. But that would be a whole different story….14

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1 Portuguese is the official language of the following countries: Portugal, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe, Angola, Mozambique, and East Timor. In Cape Verde, Creole is also an official language. In the other African countries and in East-Timor, Portuguese coexists with several other native languages.


3 See footnote 2

4 My translation. The same applies to the rest of the quotes of Portuguese authors.

5 I have used the author’s MA thesis, not the book, which was published in 1998.

6 Note that there was no freedom of speech in dictatorial Portugal, however.

7 The Luso-Tropicalist theme is endlessly reproduced in travel guides and literature, in pop culture, and so on.

8 Lusophony (*Lusofonia*), similarly to *Francophonie* in France, is the catch word in contemporary Portugal used for describing the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries.
Casa dos Estudantes do Império (Empire Students’ Home) was the institution that housed students from the colonies in Lisbon. The fact that the sons (less so the daughters) of colonial elites met in the metropolitan center allowed for the creation of anti-colonial thought and networking. A similar situation occurred in the French Empire. PAIGC stands for African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde.

This is particularly obvious in the Cape Verdelan diaspora. Cape Verde’s economy depends enormously on emigrants’ remittances from the US, Portugal, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Senegal, and other countries. Cultural products like music play an important role in the definition of a sense of being Cape Verdelan. They establish links of ‘community’ between Cape Verdeans around the world, and ‘talk’ more about ‘home’ and ‘roots’ in the archipelago than about any sort of further creolization in the host countries.

Manuel Ferreira, Portuguese literary critic who played a central role in defining creoleness as the essence of Cape Verdelan literature.

Brazilian anthropologist Arthur Ramos was one of the inspirations for Gilberto Freyre’s work and was part of the Boas-inspired sort of Brazilian culturalism that countered previous racist interpretations of local society.

A significant number of the articles in Claridade were ethnographic, in an attempt to systematize ‘folk’ culture.

Cape Verdelan immigration in Portugal created the first African community in the country as of the 1960s. Processes of racism and scapegoating were soon to build the stereotype of the ‘Cape Verdelan with a knife’, an allusion to growing social fears of crime and rape at the time. The post-colonial situation of Portugal is analysed in parts of Vale de Almeida 2000 and 2003.