On the Lusophone Postcolony:
‘Culture’, ‘race’, ‘language’

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On June 10th, 2005, Portugal’s National Day (celebrating Camões, the epic poet of the age of discoveries, as well as Portuguese communities in the diaspora), televisions reported the first arrastão ever in a Portuguese beach. Arrastão refers to the act of rapid raiding of a group (namely people on a beach) by a collective of thieves, generally children and youths. The expression originates in Brazil. The news mentioned a large group (hundreds, literally) of young men from the ‘problematic’ poor suburbs of Lisbon. This description was implicitly racialized, and some amateur cell phone camera images did indicate the color of the ‘perpetrators’, contrasting that of bystanders bathing in the sun. Rumors spread instantly, both on and off the media, generating a sense of confirmation: Lisbon had finally ‘exploded’ - the anticipated outcome of life conditions in the poor suburbs; of their African immigrant demography; of the misfit character of the so-called second and third immigrant generations; of the perceived growing insecurity.

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1 Superlative form of the noun arrasto, derived from the verb arrastar, meaning to sweep up, drag, pull, or tow, as in fishing boats that harvest large quantities of fish with a huge net pulled by the boat. A possible translation would be “big sweep”.

due to crimes publicized as having black authorship. The fact that the arrastão happened on June 10th could also be seen as an indication of politicized rebellion.

As a matter of fact, a few weeks later an extreme rightwing group did stage a demonstration against the arrastão. The problem is that by then it was already public knowledge that it had not happened\(^2\). All had been a misunderstanding, so the police and the media were to confirm. A large group of ‘black’ and ‘white’ youngsters had indeed been on the beach at Carcavelos; there had indeed been some conflicts among them; the police did intervene; and large numbers of these youngsters did run across the beach – but they were running away from the police. In spite of police denial of there having been an arrastão, some media insisted on the version, and social rumor took care of the rest. One can still hear people mention it, as if denials of the event were weaker that the imagination of the possibility of the event – and the ‘reality’ of visual ‘confirmation’ of a ‘dark’ human mass running, jumping over ‘white’ bodies.

So Lisbon had finally ‘exploded’, but hadn’t really exploded. Immigration is increasingly perceived as an index of development of the host country – something that is possible because of the underdevelopment of the immigrants’ countries… Incidence of ‘gang crime’, the formation of a ‘gangsta culture’, the coming of age of Portuguese hip hop cultural expressions or, for that matter, an arrastão, can all be conceived in the imaginary as indexes of a broad notion of ‘development’, i.e., ‘things that happen in rich countries’. To that extent, they are desired events, practical confirmations of the perceived reversal of positions from a Portugal of emigrants to a Portugal of immigrants.

\(^2\) http://www.eraumavezumarrastao.net/
The episode denotes the negative expectations of mainstream media and society towards Portugal’s black population. ‘Black’ – *negro* or *preto* or *de cor* or *africano*, according to different subject positions and relationalities – is what lies under the mixed perception of immigration, poor suburbia, petty crime and street insecurity, and cultural expressions like rap or hip hop. These realities, as in the present case, are not only highly policed but mediated by the police force – that is, the general mainstream public’s perception of what is going on is in itself a matter of police. The notion of the gangs, inspired in US movies could not be farther from reality and yet has colonized the imaginations. The *arrastão* imagery is taken from another inspiring context for crime, namely urban Brazil, in particular Rio de Janeiro. (Later when the Paris revolts of late 2005 took place, the question was ‘when is it going to happen here in Portugal?’).

Any careful observer – much more so an anthropologist – can’t help but notice the web of contradictions in Portuguese postcolonial reconfigurations. The readiness to associate an event like the *arrastão* with ‘black’ criminality stands in shocking contrast with popular and official representations of the Portuguese as non-racists. Surely contradictions are the very stuff of social relations, and representations often play the ideological part of wrapping reality in shiny paper. But what seems to be specific of the Portuguese situation is the fact that explanations for the alleged non-racism are grounded in the colonial experience. When Gilberto Freyre’s luso-tropicalism was adopted and adapted by the late colonial Portuguese authorities in the 1950s and 60s, it provided the script for the
national narrative of the exceptional capacity of the Portuguese for adaptation and miscegenation.

Let us then go back to colonial history in order to then see the ways in which it is actualized in the present. After Brazil’s independence in the 1820s, the Portuguese state entered a period of what local literati called ‘Decadence’. ‘Decadence’ can of course be seen as economic decadence, if we consider the loss of the riches of Brazil. But it was perceived mostly as national decadence, as the loss of the narrative consistency that spanned the period from the age of exploration and discoveries to the reliance on South American resources. Political upheaval (the struggle between absolutist and liberal monarchist camps, and later between monarchist and republican) contributed to the emergence of divergent camps regarding citizenship and political subjectivity; scientific discussions on race and slavery, the hygienization of the working classes, discourses on the peasantry and national authenticity, or debates on the viability of the Portuguese nation. International political-economic configurations – marked by the hegemony of Britain in commerce and in the colonial project – ultimately led to this country’s Ultimatum on Portugal: it had to effectively occupy and administer its colonial possessions in Africa in order to have its sovereignty legitimized; and it was not to endeavor in the territorial expansion of the Pink Map project, connecting the Atlantic and Indian Oceans’ coasts.

Several authors (Alexandre, 2000) have clearly shown that the motivation for the move to Africa was both economic and ideological. The Portuguese state engaged in the creation
of ‘New Brazils’ in Africa. A crucial element was, however, absent: there never was, in spite of political decisions, a true colonization of the African colonies – large contingents of Portuguese peasants continued to migrate to Brazil, not to Africa. The chances for the creation of a process of colonization and ethnogenesis of the Brazilian sort were (or so it seems obvious today) quite slim (not to mention the abyssal difference in historical context, between sixteenth and nineteenth century concepts of citizenship, humanity and so on). Furthermore, political upheaval in Portugal, mainly before and during the Republican period of the early twentieth century, left the African colonial project ‘on paper’, so to speak – as a series of projects and ‘colonizations of the future’, with a few rare exceptions (governor Norton de Matos’s actions in Angola, for instance, or the actual military struggle against African polities in Southern Mozambique or in Guinea).

Everything was to change with the advent of Salazar’s dictatorship on the aftermath of the military coup of 1926. From that year until 1974 Portugal lived under a dictatorial regime marked not so much by fascism as by a local version of integralism, i.e., a vision of the nation as an isolated rural haven of Catholicism, patriarchal obedience, corporativism and economic protectionism. An isolated haven that, nevertheless, had its economy increasingly depend on the African colonies. Also, its national narrative and sense of identity – as promoted by the state, of course, but with amazing hegemonic efficacy – increasingly depended on the conflation of the imagination of the Discoveries, with the colonization and ethnogenesis of Brazil, and with colonialism in Africa. A true modern colonial project saw then the light of day in the Portuguese African colonies,
until the wars of liberation that started in the 1960s led to the demise not only of colonialism but of the dictatorship itself in 1974.

2.

Now, as an anthropologist and not an historian or political scientist, I am particularly interested in the history of anthropological thought during what Clarence-Smith (1985) called the third empire. The notion of Empire and the national utopia of building ‘New Brazils’ were part of the boosting and maintenance of national pride. However, academic and elite discourses, such as anthropology, focused mainly on the definition of Portugal and the Portuguese for quite some time. A consistent and lasting colonial anthropology was practically non-existent. This does not, however, preclude that self-representations were also based on representations of the colonial Other, even if there was no miscegenation with those Others. Miscegenation had been useful in the construction of Brazil as a neo-European nation in the Americas, but would be contradictory with a notion of Empire in Africa.

If the above mentioned *arrastão* is a drama that talks about racialization in Portugal, we should then look into questions of race, segregation, purity, miscegenation. We can identify three ‘periods’ in the debates on hybridism and miscegenation – debates that are in a way the logical continuation of a tradition of attention to purity in the colonial endeavor in general, as demonstrated by Boxer (1969). Two anthropologists, Tamagnini and Mendes Correia, can personify the first period - one of concern with the racial definition of the Portuguese and of opposition to miscegenation. A second, more culturalist period, is personified by Jorge Dias
and the influence of Freyre in his work; it is a period of concern with the plural ethnic origins of the Portuguese and with the resolution of the ‘colonial problem’ in the light of the Brazilian experience. Finally, a third period would correspond to the post-1974 era and can only be outlined in terms of the contemporary multiculturalist debates.

Eusébio Tamagnini and Mendes Correia were the leaders of the two schools of anthropology, respectively in Coimbra and Oporto. Their work influenced a period that encompasses the Constitutional Monarchy, the First Republic and the dictatorship of the Estado Novo. I will focus mainly on Tamagnini. In 1902, in a paper on the population of São Tomé, composed of early settlers and indentured labour migration, Tamagnini asked: ‘How valuable are the products of the crossing between colonizing and colonized races?’ (1902: 11). His answer was: ‘(…) the dialect of São Tomé, being a Creole that belongs to the second group, must be seen as a degenerate version of Continental Portuguese’ (1902: 13). Further on he says that

‘(…) easiness in relationships among the natives resulted necessarily in unfaithfulness and jealousy, which are obviously the causes for most crimes committed in creole societies: prostitution, indecent behavior, and its repugnant varieties, such as pederasty, lesbianism, rape and so on, which are practiced in a terrifying way in creole societies, and which are the most obvious evidence of the shameful way in which the European peoples have been civilizing and colonizing the other peoples that they call savages (1902: 39-40 in Santos 1996: 49).
Language, gender, sexuality, national identity, and colonialism: Robert Young (1995) could have based his work on Tamagnini alone. Besides being an indication of how the concept of gender was conceived as analogous to that of ‘race’ (see Stepan 1986) – in a process in which scientists used racial difference to explain gender difference and vice versa -, what we witness here is also a moral and political discourse on colonialism and its implication in the construction of national identity. Throughout his career, Tamagnini was to publish several studies from 1916 to 1949. Influenced by Broca’s and Topinard’s work, he was looking for anthropometric statistical averages of the Portuguese and their coincidence with those of the Europeans. In 1936 he concluded that ‘we can define the studied population thus: dolicocephalic, … of medium height, with brownish or pale white skin, brown or black hair, dark eyes’ (1936: 195 in Santos 1996: 108). Therefore, he concludes, ‘the Portuguese can ... be considered members of the Mediterranean race’ (1936: 195). Neither did the nasal index of the Portuguese ‘reveal any quantitatively relevant sign of mestiçagem with platirhine Negroid elements’ (1944: 22).

Although after the 1920s he had to take into consideration the developments in genetics, he did so within a Malthusian framework in connection with colonial issues. In the First National Congress of Colonial Anthropology in 1934 in Oporto (one year after the legislation of the Colonial Act), he alerted to the dangers of mestiçagem: ‘when two peoples or two races have reached different cultural levels and have organized completely different social systems, the consequences of mestiçagem are necessarily disastrous’ (1934a: 26 in Santos 1996: 137). In a panel on population in the Congress on the Portuguese World (at the occasion of the Portuguese World Expo), he presented a study
about the blood groups of the Portuguese (1940) and concluded that the Portuguese population had ‘been able to maintain relative ethnic purity and although the origins in a Nordic type have to be found within the mutations in a brown dolicocephalic past, we, the Portuguese, as representatives of that common ancestor can not be accused of having spoiled [literally ‘made bastards of’] the family’ (1940: 22 in Santos 1996: 145). However, in 1944 he had to acknowledge – albeit with one important safeguard - that:

‘... it would be foolish to pretend denying the existence of *mestiçagem* between the Portuguese and the elements of the so-called colored races. The fact that they are a colonizing people makes it impossible to avoid ethnic contamination. What one can not accept is the raising of such *mestiçagem* to the category of a sufficient factor of ethnic degeneration to such a point that anthropologists would have to place the Portuguese outside the white races or classify them as negroid *mestiços*’ (1944 in Santos 1996: 12).

One year before his appointment as Minister of Education (he held the post from 1934 to 1936), he suggested the creation of a Society of Eugenic Studies. In 1938 psychiatrist Barahona Fernandes was supporting eugenics against the ‘false behaviorist idea” (influenced by Lamarck’s transformationism) of the human being as a reflection of the environment (Pimentel 1998: 18). In the year following the 1926 coup that established dictatorship, Mendes Correia (head of the Institute of Anthropology and Ethnology in Oporto) had called for the segregation of relapsing criminals, for the sterilization of

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3 He was also mayor of Oporto from 1936 to 1942, member of the Chamber of Corporations (a Corporativist assembly in the Estado Novo) in 1945, and director of the Colonial School for a period.
degenerates, and for the regulation of immigration and the banning of marriage for professional beggars. In 1932 Mendes Correia invited Renato Kehl, president of the Brazilian Eugenics organization to give a conference in Oporto. On the occasion, the Brazilian scientist proposed the introduction of both positive and negative eugenic measures, publicized the advantages of marriage within the same class or race and condemned *mestiçagem* for being ‘dissolving, dissuasive, demoralizing and degrading’. This attests to the fact that similar debates were going on in Brazil, as part of national construction there; the notion of a celebrated miscegenation and racial democracy was yet to become official.

Although eugenics was not a successful approach in Portugal, the question of ‘racial improvement’ was much discussed in 1934, in relation to the colonial question and the issue of *mestiçagem*. Although some participants in the First Congress of Colonial Anthropology praised *mestiçagem*, Tamagnini was against it. Based on a study of somatology and aptitude tests done with 16 Cape Veridian and 6 *mestiços* from Macau who had come to the Colonial Expo of 1934 in Oporto, Mendes Correia concluded that miscegenation was a condemnable practice. In the plenary session Tamagnini reminded that ‘often it is presented as evidence of the higher colonizing capacity of the Portuguese the little repugnance that they have regarding sexual approaches to elements of other ethnic origins’, and asserted that ‘it is necessary to change radically such an attitude’ (Tamagnini 1934b: 26 in Castelo 1998: 111). And he goes on: ‘It is in the social arena that the fact of *mestiçagem* has graver consequences. The *mestiços*, because they do not adapt to either system, are rejected by both…’ (in Castelo 1998: 111). Mendes Correia
couldn’t agree more: ‘…o mulato é saudade de si mesmo (being mulatto is longing for oneself)… just like the despised hermaphrodite outcries the conflict between the sexes … the mestiço is thus an unexpected being in the plan of the world, an unfortunate experiment of the Portuguese’. (Mendes Correia 1940: 122 in Castelo 1998: 112).

Also in the Congress on the Portuguese World, ethnographer Pires de Lima countered Gilberto Freyre’s thesis on the hybrid origin of the Portuguese. Lima said that there had only been three fundamental ethnic groups: Lusitanians, Romans, and Germanics. He saw Jews, Moors and Blacks as ‘intruders’ (Castelo 1998: 114), and he strongly objected to the promotion of miscegenation. His ideas could not be more in agreement with the representations of the national identity sponsored by the Estado Novo and they still present today in the common sense, that is, the collective amnesia regarding those three peoples who were either expelled or ‘whitened’.

Gilberto Freyre’s theses were to be adopted by Jorge Dias, renovator of Portuguese anthropology after Mendes Correia (Dias’ predecessor at the Oporto ‘school’). For Dias, the unity of the Portuguese is the outcome of a melting pot of different ethnic origins. Colonial situations, on the other hand, must be distinguished: the Brazilian and the Cape-Verdian contexts, on the one hand, are based on miscegenation; and the African contexts, on the other, are marked by weak colonization and a late white migration (after 1940 only). Dias showed his opposition to Tamagnini and Mendes Correia. In 1956 he said that the creation of the mestiço is positive for Man’s genetic pool and that he believed that the luso-tropical mestiço was the man of the future (Castelo 1998: 120).
In the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, the legitimization (or the contestation) of colonialism could no longer be done with arguments of politico-economic interest and sovereignty claims, but increasingly with ‘socio-anthropological’ arguments, even when marked by a strong mythical character. According to Cláudia Castelo the reception of Gilberto Freyre’s work was not uniform in Portugal. Right-wing intellectuals made a nationalistic interpretation of it, reducing Freyre’s ideas to appraisal of Portuguese colonial exceptionalism. Those on the left were more critical and tended to compare the doctrine with the historical facts and political practice. The project of Imperial renaissance had been, up until then, on the antipodes of Freyre’s ideas. Many supporters of the dictatorial regime assumed that the black ‘race’ was inferior and were against *mestiçagem*. Not until after WWII – with the re-christening of the colonies as ‘Overseas Provinces’ and the abolishment of the Colonial Act did the notion of a pluri-racial and pluri-continental nation come close to Freyre’s interpretation. Freyre’s famous journey to the Portuguese colonies started two months after the 1951 Constitutional Amendments that abolished the Act. Freyre’s journeys were the first in a series of appropriations of his ideas by the Portuguese government for purposes of international propaganda. Luso-tropicalist doctrine soon became Portugal’s weapon against the international pressures for de-colonization.

Political scientist Adriano Moreira fully incorporated the doctrine into his analyses and political projects after the 1950’s. It was not until the 1960’s, once the Colonial wars had started, that he (as Minister of the Overseas, from 1960 to 1962) tried to narrow the gap
between theory and practice. The Native Status Laws were abolished (they separated citizens from natives and prescribed compulsory labor) and relative autonomy was granted to colonial governments. But Moreira was to be ousted from power by the ‘integrationist’ sectors of the regime. His version of ‘multiracialism’ nonetheless became a staple in the regime’s colonial and nationalistic vocabulary. In 1961 he had written: ‘…we want to make it clear to the commonwealth of nations that it is our nation’s resolve to pursue with a policy of multi-racial integration, without which there will be neither peace nor civilization in Black Africa (…) a policy whose benefits are illustrated by the largest country of the future that is Brazil …’ (Moreira 1961: 10-11).

The regime’s propaganda stated that Portuguese Africa would one day be like Brazil, i.e., a ‘racial democracy’. Consequently, he had to explain that the Native Status Laws had been misunderstood, saying that it was ‘just because of our concern with authenticity that our… Native Status Laws deny the natives the political rights related to such institutions [of sovereignty; he is referring the right to vote, among others], many accused us of denying them nationality [citizenship]’ (1961: 12). Moreira uses, then, the argument of authenticity and preservation of ethnic particularism as a justification. To different cultures (and ‘races’), different rights, in order to respect identities – that seems to be the rationale. (This sort of ‘right-wing multiculturalism’ remains alive today in many sectors in Portugal).

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The population of the Portuguese colonies in Africa was divided into three statuses: colonials/nationals, assimilated, and natives. This form of classification, contrary in essence to miscegenation, did not apply in those territories where ‘local civilization’ was acknowledged (for instance, India) or that were the result of ‘hybrid’ colonization (white colonials and black slaves in unpopulated land), such as Cape Verde.
‘Assimilation’ was a central concept in the colonial administration. It was often juxtaposed to Freyre’s and Dias’ notions of miscibilidade. They are common themes in the historiography of Portuguese Expansion, Discoveries and Colonialism, as well as in the so-called ‘sociology of the formation of Brazil’ (of which Freyre’s work is an example), and also in the wider debates on Portuguese national identity and ethnogenesis.

Moreira said that ‘cultures, not races, can be eternal’ (1963 (1958): 20). It is on the basis of this presupposition that he was in favor of inter-racial marriages, allegedly because the family was the best instrument for the creation of multi-racial societies. Nevertheless he said that miscegenation could cause a problem: ‘we have less mixed families today than in the past … because the deficit of white women has diminished. Mestiços now tend to close up as a group, which is not beneficial for integration’ (Moreira 1963, 1958: 154).

The source of concern is clear: in the colonial context of Portuguese Africa, a mestiço group could become a specific social and professional group, tied to administration, living in the cities, playing the role of mediators and thus potentially generating nationalist and anti-colonial feelings. The ambiguous discourse on miscegenation in the late colonial period was, therefore, the very negation of hybridism.

Freyre’s influence is a fascinating case. If, in Brazil, his ideas can be interpreted as either reactionary or progressive depending on context, in Portugal the dictatorial and colonial atmosphere increased its ambiguity. Freyre’s ideas can undoubtedly be appropriated as humanistic and anti-racist; the problem lies in the veracity of his argument about Portuguese colonization, allowing for political arguments which underplay racist practices because of the expected utopia of full miscegenation Brazilian style (which is,
anyway, a mystification of the Brazilian racial formation). I have said elsewhere that I believe that Freyre condensed a diffuse argument – somewhere between common sense and hegemony — that links the theories of national identity and formation in both Brazil and Portugal (as well as the modern Portuguese colonial project in Africa). It is a mythical discourse with scientific pretensions. Freyre’s argument focuses on the supposed disposition of the Portuguese to engage in ‘hybrid and slave-based’ colonization of the Tropical lands. This disposition is supposedly explained by the Portuguese ethnic and cultural past as an ‘undefined’ people (1992: 5). This lack of definition (i.e. ‘racial’ and cultural purity) amounts to a ‘balance of antagonisms’ (1992: 6), and Portuguese ‘plasticity’, based on aclimatibilidade, mobilidade e miscibilidade (adaptation to different climates, mobility, and the ability to mingle/miscegenate), was the strategy for compensating demographic weakness, thus building a colonial system based on the ‘patriarchal and slave-owning family, with a sui generis version of Catholicism and sexual mores’.

Freyre’s narrative occupied center stage in the construction of Brazilian self-representations. But it is a development of discourses on Portuguese exceptionalism that are prior to Freyre’s; and which were made systematic, as doctrine, after his intellectual production and in the context of colonialism in Africa. The central problem is: Brazilian and Portuguese ethnogenesis were both done through a positive reinterpretation of historical processes of extreme inequality, thanks to the neutral presentation of the notion of miscegenation, forcefully separated from racialized social and economic relations. This became a central
problem in the national definitions in both countries, among the Black movement in Brazil, and in the identity redefinitions in post-colonial Portugal.

In Portugal, Jorge Dias dealt with the set of psychological qualities that supposedly defined the specificity of Portuguese culture. Geographical conditions and miscegenation take center stage in his theory. It also focuses on the ‘expansionistic character’ and in ‘plasticity’. However, before he was to write on ethnic psychology in the American Culture and Personality sense, Dias made a point of closing the debate on the Lusitanians that had been paramount in the 19th century. Then, anthropologists, historians and archaeologists concerned with finding the Portuguese originality had constructed the Lusitanians as the ancestors of the Portuguese. Jorge Dias presented an alternative ethnogenealogy, in which pluralism became the explanatory factor for Portuguese singularity (although, of course, the notion of originality remained, instead of the assumption that all peoples have plural ethnic genealogies…). João Leal says that this narrative allowed for the construction of a gallery of ethnic ancestors more in tune with the sort of Diffusionism that had influenced Dias (Leal 1999: 18). But it allowed most for the supposed originality of Portugal: the unique capacity for mixing cultures.

3.

Fifty years of dictatorship, colonial wars until the 1970’s, and the tutelage of the Brazilian myth have marked heavily the self-representations of the Portuguese in the democratic and post-colonial period. In 1974, democracy was re-established and in the following two years the colonies became independent. In 1986 Portugal joined the
The Luso-tropicalist discourse has for long become common sense, an everyday theory and an integral part of Portuguese representations of nationality. It is a dense and pervasive discourse because it contains the very promises that politically progressive ideas could subscribe to, namely the notion of miscegenation and hybridization. The effect of racial hegemony that Hanchard (1994) reports for Brazil (culturalism as a factor that precludes ethno-political mobilization) works similarly in Portugal. But it is strengthened here by the historical amnesia about some ethnogenetic contributions (jews, africans, arabs), slavery, colonialism and the colonial wars. These issues are now being raised in Portuguese society at the same time that a redefinition of national identity is being done because of the European Union. Notions related to the ‘Portuguese Diaspora’ and ‘Lusophony’ are also being invented. Jorge Vala et al. (1999), in a recent study on racism in Portugal, say that

‘it is common to think that the specificity of our culture and of our colonial history, the easy miscegenation of the Portuguese with other peoples, the fact that many blacks residing in Portugal are national citizens, or the fact that most African immigrants come from the ex-colonies, have all contributed for the specificity of a possible sort of racism in Portugal. In the end, this idea is still a consequence of the ‘luso-tropicalist’ ideology
and political actors from different areas sponsor it. However, the results of our study demonstrate that racist social beliefs in Portugal are organized in ways similar to other European countries, that the factors are not significantly different from those underlying subtle or flagrant racism in other countries, and that in Portugal, as in other European countries, the anti-racist norm applies to flagrant racism, not to subtle racism… (1999: 194).

As a matter of fact, at the same time that there is public censorship of flagrant racism (allowing for the reproduction of the subtle kind), a paradoxical process is happening. Teresa Fradique, in her study on *rap* says that it is ‘…[the definition of] a product through the outlining of its difference (cultural, social, racial) vis-à-vis the society in which it emerges; it is then presented as a national product…’ (1998: 110). I have observed a similar process going on in Brazil, in my study of the Black movement and the politics of cultural representation. Fradique, after defining an association between ethnic group, social inequality and culture, sees ethnic minorities as ‘a kind of ‘new cultural class’, made homogeneous due precisely to a fuzzy mixing of those three categories, and politically and sociologically created in order to manage the new configurations which are inherent to post-colonial societies’ (1998: 123). This process, which involves an anti-racist discourse that objectifies cultures, is similar to new racisms, not only in Stolcke’s terms (culture instead of race), but also in Gilroy’s: the capacity to associate discourses on patriotism, nationalism, xenophobia, militarism and sexual difference in a complex system that gives race its contemporary meaning, constituted around two central concepts: identity and culture (Gilroy 1987: 43).
Parallel to this, multiculturalism has been one of the rhetorical devices most used by the politics of identity (Comaroff 1996, Hobsbawm 1996) in post-colonial contexts. The dominant ideas in multiculturalism presuppose always an authoritative center of cultural reference which ends up functioning with the logic of assimilation. Its main keywords are tolerance and integration. Vertovec (1996) points to the correspondence between multicultural initiatives and some arguments of the new cultural racisms. Both use culturalist perspectives: the multicultural society is divided into several unicultural subunits, and culture is seen as a human characteristic that is virtually embedded in the genes of individuals (1996: 51, cf. Stolcke 1995). Segal and Handler talk of a culturalization of races, in which difference is objectified in an ensemble of multiple singular cultures (Segal e Handler 1995: 391-9).

Issues such as luso-tropical specificity, historical miscegenation, racial democracy or the non-racism of the Portuguese and the Brazilians, have been faced in diverse ways: as ideologies that mask a harsher reality; as an outcome of racial hegemony; as a form of naïf wishful thinking, compensating for the structural weaknesses of both countries; or as having some validity and an unaccomplished potential that can become a political project for the future.

João Pina-Cabral, in an analysis of the different meanings of racism for the man on the street and anthropologists, suggests a third way, beyond the neo-Freyrian vs anti-Freyrian divide: ‘I do not refute Charles Boxer’s contention that there were discrimination,
prejudice and ethnic violence in the Portuguese colonial empire, like certain hasty nationalists are again denying. It is just that we can not deny the evidence of the fact that interethnic barriers based on color were not constructed and maintained in the same way in the British and Portuguese colonial empires’ (Pina-Cabral 1998:3, my translation). I subscribe to this position because, otherwise, the perceptions of color differences by common people in Portugal would have to be dismissed by the anthropologists as ‘false consciousness’. Also, because denying exceptionalism is not tantamount to denying specificity.

Angela Gilliam calls attention to Fry’s critique of Hanchard. Peter Fry claims that the multiple mode of racial classification in Brazil allows individuals to be classified in varied ways, thus de-racializing individual identity. The Black movement’s contestation of this model supposedly led to the denial of any sort of Brazilian specificity. The bipolar mode – typical of the USA and the Black Movement militants – endorses the racist notion of the One Drop Rule (Fry 1995-6). Gilliam, however, says that the One Drop Rule has been changed by blacks themselves, from the concept of pollution to that of inclusion (1997: 89). Sansone, who supports Fry, accuses the ‘lusophobia’ of those researchers (especially Skidmore 1994) whose major concern seems to be to criticize the ‘ambiguity’ of Brazilian racial relations and who are fascinated by an hypothetical bipolarization (Sansone 1996: 215). Hanchard classifies Fry and Sansone as neo-freyrians, since the multipolar model supports Freyre’s view that miscegenation and hybridism would lead to the democratization of racial relations (Hanchard 1997).
In Portugal, while the production of black cultural specificities is arising, and that subtle racism persists under the condemnation of flagrant racism, two factors are occurring: on one hand (and I shall not deal with it here) the way that discourses on commemoration (Discoveries, Expo etc) are permeated by the rhetoric of multiculturalism, tolerance and culture contact. On the other, there is a redefinition of nationality. Schiller e Fouron (1997) say that the political leaders of countries such as Portugal have been redefining their respective nation states as transnational ones so as to include their populations in the Diaspora. The authors claim that underlying this are concepts of national identity marked by the issue of ‘race’, presupposing a line of descendence and blood ties. States that export emigrants define nationality along the line of descendence, not through the shared language, history, culture or territory.

This raises a problem: Lusophony, as a global geostrategic concept, would serve to define ‘culture’. Culture would be something given to others by Portugal. Nationality, however, would be only for us who belong in the genealogy. In this sense miscegenation and mestiçagem are discursively constructed as the passing of Portuguese blood for the others, and rarely the other way around. And when the others are among ‘us’ the definition of their cultural authenticity places them outside nationality/citizenship, although they are allowed to enjoy multiculturalism.

Schiller and Fouron show how European nations in the late 19th century considered national history according to specific lineages – the Arians, the Celts, etc. The same happened in Portugal with the debate on the Lusitanians (cf. Leal 1999). But the semi-
peripheral specificity of Portugal, her Empire and post-Brazil colonialism in Africa, led to accentuating the notion of *mestiçagem*, although the abolition of laws that countered it came late, with the end of the Native Status Laws. Referring to Wade (1993a), Schiller and Fouron say that even when miscegenation is exalted, it is often implicitly defined as in opposition to the color black, and the latter is not mentioned or acknowledged in the narrative of racial mixture. The language of the color white is the one adopted even when the nation defines itself as a product of miscegenation. This process went further in Portugal, since it is not a neo-European nation in the Americas, but a colonizing center (albeit a weak and semi-peripheral one).

It is no longer a question of ‘measuring’ whether miscegenation is good or bad for the future of the ‘races’. It is no longer a question of discussing the difference between ‘race’ and ‘culture’. It is no longer a question of evaluating those debates in terms of the construction or maintenance of either nation-states or colonial empires. Nowadays the terms describing situations of hybridism in post-colonial contexts and increasing globalization present them as accomplished facts or as expressions of political correction or *wishful thinking*. The present discourse on hybridism seems to be challenged by emancipatory movements such as the Black movement, with its refusal of syncretism; by neo-nationalist movements that are eager for ethnic cleansing; and by deconstructionism and the criticism of post-modern anthropologists. While in the practices of social life people seem to go on reproducing a covert horror toward mixture - and social barriers that perpetuate ‘races’ are reproduced -, the praising of cultural mixture (one in which each contribution is clearly defined) emerges in the field of cultural consumption products. During a brief visit to Portugal, Bahian musician
Carlinhos Brown said:

‘This is an album and a show that celebrates miscegenation in Brazil … That remixing is a feeling that only the miscigenated knows. It is like having loved a woman for the first time: the orgasm is different… The miscigenated one is… the man of the third millennium … and in the end of the millennium there is no people like the Portuguese people who can rightfully celebrate. I do not know if Portugal is aware of that. Because Portugal conquered miscegenation: to unite peoples through the easiest way, through taste, through sight, through acceptance. Portugal may have been a great good for the black culture (Público, 5.08.99, p. 21).

This is, of course, more than wishful thinking – it is the reproduction of ideology, and an effect of hegemony. But it also indicates a utopian aspiration, albeit misplaced. Hybridism, miscegenation, and correlate terms, have a tense history behind them. Any cultural, social, or political project that wants to promote mixture for the promotion of new social realities will necessarily have to be also a critical project, one that evaluates and learns from that tense history of practices and knowledges. Anthropologists could contribute to this with the critical and comparative analysis of those social formations, namely the so-called Creole ones, which may constitute a glimpse of the desired future. Even if they are the by-products of the colonial encounter and conflict.
4.

To conclude, I will of course go back to the beginning. Why did the arrastão happen? Because, for the first time in history, the colonized are among us. An extraordinary exception is introduced in the narrative of miscegenation and ‘exceptional’ colonial practices: immigrants are not those we mix with. They acquired our language; it was bestowed upon them, to be used by them in their homelands. Furthermore, in the process of geographical deslocation they occupied a class position in Portugal that deprived them of all the allure of the exotic and the localized; they now occupy the margins of the center. The rhetoric of Lusophony applies only to inter-state relations, not to inter-people relations.

Immigrants can be physical mementos of slavery, forced labor, colonialism, failed assimilation projects in the colonies, colonial wars, the return to Portugal of Portuguese immigrants to the colonies in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. For this to be clear, it suffices to compare this negative expectation towards Black Africans in Portugal to those towards Brazilians in general. Not only because Brazilian migration originates mostly in ‘white’ areas of Minas Gerais and São Paulo state, but also because perceptions of Brazilian ‘blackness’ are infused with the image of the sensuous mulata and allude to the positive mythology of the Portuguese role and ‘success’ in the ethnogenesis of Brazil. Brazilians are ascribed, in the new labor market, to jobs that deal with the public: restaurants, cafés, shops, because of the expectation about their sympathy and the perceptions of their version of Portuguese as warm and cheerful. On the opposite end of the spectrum, the African Black immigrant is the sign of the failure of modern colonialism in Africa.
 Needless to say – or maybe not – perceptions and expectations of and about Black African immigrants are connected to their actual situation as (non)subjects when one considers immigration laws, labor conditions and the social geography of Black Portugal. The Black man in the construction site, the Black peixeira (Fikes N. A.), the speakers of Creoles, the inhabitants of iconic neighborhoods targeted by the media and the police (such as Cova da Moura; and there are no ‘Brazilian’ equivalents), where the young Black men supposedly grow up into a ‘life of crime’.

The political process of postcolonial reconfiguration relies on the creation of a geopolitical space within the globalized world. The designation of PALOP (Países Africanos de Lingua Oficial Portuguesa) as an euphemism for the ex-colonies as a group is part of that process; as is the creation of Lusophony as a concept that allows also for the inclusion of Brazil and other spaces (see my piece on Timor). This process, one of transforming language into a common ground of identity, is necessarily unbalanced, since there is always the danger of Portugal claiming property, ancestry and authenticity in language. It is also dangerously culturalistic, since it tends to stress the cultural contributions in detriment of social, political and economic processes in colonial times that were processes of pillage. For all intents and purposes, it elides ‘race’ and miscegenation as ‘racial’ miscegenation and only focuses on the cultural product of language.

This process is now reaching completion. By this I mean that expressions such as PALOP and Lusophony have been integrated in everyday life and in Portuguese representations.
But the interesting point is how contradictory a discourse of inclusion on a global and historical scale is with a process of manifest exclusion on a national and contemporary scale. Immigration and citizenship laws, labour conditions or lack thereof, lack of access to rights, benefits and citizenship are the characteristics of lives of immigrants in Portugal. There is an arena, however, where there is positive visibility of immigrants in Portugal: the arena of cultural production. By this I mean anything that goes from mass media consumer products like Brazilian telenovelas to apparent expressions of rebellion like Hip Hop, and everything in/between: Lusophone African literature, Cape Verdean music. All are cultural – in the sense of ideative – realities; all are cultural – in the sense of expressive – realities. They feed the Lusophony imaginary with the dimension of diversity and do not threaten the hegemony of the representation of Portugal as the pivotal point of all this.

The Lusophone postcolony is a complex web of historical and cultural connections between Portugal, Brazil, and Africa, a Black, White and Brown Atlantic of sorts. What I have tried to do here is to include the ex-colonial power in the category of the postcolony. It is there, in the ex-metropolitan center, that, through immigration, the colonial heritage becomes more apparent, more palpable, in its narrative, mythical and phantasmagoric aspects. That’s what an episode like the arrastão – the thing that did not happen yet did happen – is all about.

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